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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
HAROLD E. BEST and 
EARL CRAIG, 
Plaintiffs and Respondents, 
vs. 
BIG JIM MINING COMPANY, 
A Nevada Corporation 
Defendant and Appellant 
Case No. 8438 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This is an appeal from a judgment of the Dis-
trict Court in and for San Juan County, adjudging 
that defendant Big Jim Mining Company, a Nevada 
corporation, had abandoned the assignment of a 
lease and enterprise with regard to a piece of min-
ing property and had committed a forfeiture of 
its rights thereunder. The judgment went on to 
declare the lease assignment abandoned, forfeited, 
and cancelled, to quiet title therein, and to require 
reassignment of the lease. Damages were not 
awarded. (See Judgment) 
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The complaint of plaintiff alleges in Para-
graph 2 that in June, 1953 plaintiff was granted 
a uranium and vanadium mineral lease by the Utah 
State Land Board covering all of Section 16, Town-
ship 36 South, Range 25 East, Salt Lake Meridian. 
The lease was admitted in defendant's answer, as 
was its assignment to Herman Stern as attorney 
for the defendant. A copy of the assignment, itself 
constituting the agreement between the parties, is 
attached to the complaint as Exhibit B, and its 
execution is admitted. 
It is alleged in Paragraph 4, and admitted, that 
"on or about the 12th day of November, 1953, the 
Big Jim Mining Company accepted said assign-
t " men ... 
Succeeding paragraphs, placed in issue by de-
fendant in its answer, assert that defendant had 
failed to fulfill its obligations under its assignment 
and had abandoned the property, and failed to pay 
the sum of $5,500 to plaintiff. 
The agreement between the parties, Exhibit 
B, around the interpretation and performance of 
which issues arose, provides among other things 
for a survey of the property by defendant. It also 
provides for the payment by defendant to plaintiff 
of the sum of $5,500 if a mine on adjoining pro-
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perty intersects the leased property or if an Atomic 
Energy Commission drill report is satisfactory. 
Further provisions are made for the payment 
of a minimum of $250.00 a year, commencing with 
the calendar year 1959, by the defendant to plain-
tiff against gross mill receipts derived from the 
property .. 
In its answer, defendant denied any breach 
and affirmatively raised the issue in Paragraph 8 
that plaintiff was not the real party',finterest. 
A pretrial hearing was held, but no written 
pretrial order was ever entered. At the trial, de-
fendant was not permitted to examine concerning 
the issue of real party in interest. However, upon 
motion of counsel for plaintiff Best, one Earl Craig 
was joined as plaintiff upon the court's order, (R. 
45) without sworn testimony and over the objec-
tion of defendant's counsel. 
Judgment was for plaintiffs in the respects 
above described; motion for new trial was made and 
denied, and this appeal followed. 
Many of the points raised in this appeal deal 
with the failure of the ev~dence to support the 
judgment of the trial court, particularly with re-
gard to the issues of abandonment and forfeiture. 
Because of this, it has been necessary to discuss 
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this evidence at some length within each of these 
sections. To avoid duplication and since such dis-
cussion is believed to constitute compliance with the 
Appendix of Forms of the Rules of Civil Procedure, 
Form 32, permitting subdivision of the fact state-
ment, the facts will not again be set forth here at 
length. 
POINTS 
POINT I. THE FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF 
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT 
ABANDONED THE LEASE IS TOTALLY UNSUP-
PORTED BY, AND CONTRARY TO THE PREPON-
DERANCE OF, THE EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND APPUC-
ABLE PRECEDENTS. 
POINT II. THE FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF 
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT 
COMMITTED A FORFEITURE OF ITS RIGHTS UN: 
DER THE ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT IS TOTALLY 
UNSUPPORTED BY, AND CONTRARY TO, THE EVI-
DENCE, AND IS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLES OF 
JUSTICE· AND APPLICABLE PRECEDENTS. 
POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EX-
PLICITLY FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT THE CON-
TRACT OF DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF BEST WAS 
UNENFORCEABLE BY REASON OF LACK OF MU-
TUALITY; BUT IF SUCH FINDING OR CONCLUSION 
BE DEEMED IMPLICIT, IT IS TOTALLY CONTRARY 
TO ALL EVIDENCE AND TO THE AUTHORITIES. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND INJUSTICE IN PERMITT-
ING AMENDMENT AS TO PARTIES PLAINTIFF AT 
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THE TRIAL WITHOUT SWORN TESTIMONY, WHILE 
AT THE SAME TIME DENYING TO DEFENDANT 
THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THE IMPORTANT ISSUE 
OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST, WHICH DEFEN--
DANT HAD SPECIFICALLY RAISED AS AN ISSUE 
BY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN ITS ANSWER. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF 
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT 
ABANDONED THE LEASE IS TOTALLY UNSUP-
PORTED BY, AND CONTRARY TO THE PREPON-
DERANCE OF, THE EVIDENCE, AND IS CONTRARY 
TO THE PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE AND APPLIC-
ABLE PRECEDENTS. 
Neither the evidence, nor justice, nor applic-
able precedent, support the view of the trial court 
that the defendant has abandoned the lease assign-
ment or enterprise. 
All the evidence and principles of justice and 
all the law is to the contrary. 
The court, in its erroneous conclusions of law, 
stated: 
"1. That the plaintiffs are entitled to 
the decree of this court that the defendant 
has abandoned the assignment of the lease 
of said School Section 16 and has abandoned 
the enterprise contemplated therein." 
This conclusion is based upon findings of fact, 
which will be demonstrated themselves to be either 
unsupported by the evidence, or irrelevant, to the 
effect that the defendant could abandon the con-
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templated enterprise, and did so. (Findings of 
Fact 7 and 8.) 
The trial court could not and did not arrive 
at its conclusion of abandonment by the support of 
substantial evidence in the case. That would not 
have been possible; for the evidence, properly under-
stood, shows plainly that there was never any in-
tent to abandon or any abandonment by the defen-
dant of its rights. Rather, as will be demonstrated 
in this section of the brief, the evidence shows that 
the defendant fulfilled every obligation and pressed 
on with diligence to the fulfillment of its obliga-
tions, expending large sums of money in an earnest 
effort to make the entire undertaking worthwhile 
both to itself and plaintiff. 
Abandonment of a property or enterprise, un-
like forfeiture, is not a matter of breach or claimed 
breach of an obligation. Rather, it depends upon 
the volition and the action of the holder of the right, 
which must coincide to show clearly that the right 
has been relinquished and given up. We will show 
that neither of these essential prerequisites have, 
upon any theory, been here fulfilled. 
Simply for a definition and discussion of the 
requisites of abandonment, we turn to the Califor-
nia case of Los Angeles v. Abbott, (1933) 129 Cal. 
App. 144, 18 Pac. 2d 785, wliere it is stated: 
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"Abandonment includes the intention to 
abandon, and the external act by which such 
intention is carried into effect." (Page 787, 
Pacific Reporter citation.) 
In the Abbott case the opinion of the reviewing 
court points out that the characteristic element of 
abandonment is voluntary relinquishment by in-
tentional repudiation. 
In Berry v. Kelly (1949) 90 Cal. App. (2d) 
486, 203 Pac. (2d) 80, the reviewing court reversed 
a judgment of abandonment, holding that, despite 
delay in drilling a well, there was "no substantial 
evidence upon which the trial court could base a 
finding that defendant had abandoned ... " (Page 
81, Pacific Reporter citation.) 
The evidence in the Berry case was that defen-
dants had closed operations for several years. But 
the reviewing court said at page 81, citing several 
authorities: 
"Abandonment cannot be inferred un-
less it can fairly be shown that nonuse by 
lessee is coupled with an intent to relinquish 
all rights in the premises.'' 
In the· light of the above cases and definitions, 
let us turn to an examination of the present case 
and of thE •evidence relating to the question of 
abandonment. It will be clear this evidence does 
not support a finding of abandonment. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS RE ABANDONMENT 
The evidence shows by the testimony of plain-
tiff Best that the assignment of the lease was signed 
in June, 1953. (R. 9) 
Plaintiff Best further testified that the Big 
Jim Corporation was to be formed. 
The Big Jim Mining Company, a Nevada cor-
poration, was duly formed, around the end of the 
summer of 1953. (R. 61.) It was formed for the 
specific purpose of dealing with the mining property 
whose lease was assigned by plaintiff Best (R. 61); 
this is the testimony of Mr. Jack Egar, president 
of the corporation, and whose testimony in tb 
regard was apparently not challenged. 
The corporation, formed for the very purpose 
of dealing with the lease here in question, set out 
at once, and continuingly, to achieve the purpose of 
pushing forward its project. Almost all testimony 
in this regard is virtually uncontradicted and un-
shaken. 
The defendant had a mining survey made (R. 
65). It hired a mining engineer in Grand J un~tion 
in August, 1953. (R. 65.) It received reports in 
June and October, 1953. It obtained an Atomic 
Energy Commission report (also unfavorable) 
around April, 1954. (R. 71.) It employed and paid 
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Frank Wicks to interpret and explain these reports 
(R. 68, 70, 71). 
When Wicks interpreted the reports as unfa-
vorable, the defendant's board of directors conferred 
on further action, and, Mr. Egar testified: 
''It was decided that I should try to in-
terest other people in the property." ( R. 70.) 
Perservering, Mr. Egar in June, 1954, "took 
a trip to New York to see Mr. Schultz of Lehman 
Brothers who are investment brokers." (R. 72.) 
In New York Mr. Egar discussed the property 
with Mr. Schultz but was turned down on the basis 
'-~f the unfavorable reports. (R. 72.) 
Mr. Egar made other efforts and contacted a 
firm in the mining business, Shattuck Denn Mining 
Corporation of New York. On June 8, 1954, Mr. 
Egar spoke to the president of this concern. (R. 74.) 
Around July 1, 1954, in a long distance tele-
phone conversation with the president of the Shat-
tuck Denn concern, Mr. Egar was finally notified 
that Shattuck Denn did not desire to go forward 
with regard to the property. (R. 75.) 
Defendant's efforts continued. Mr. Egar saw 
more people about the property; all had their geol-
ogists look at the property. (R. 75.) Among others 
approached were Mr. Blair W. Stewart of the Mudd 
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interests, m1n1ng and oil people in Los Angeles 
( R. 85). The defendant received a letter ( Defen-
dant's Exhibit 4) of October 4, 1954, which said 
in part: 
"I am sorry to so have to advise you of 
our conclusion but wish to express Otlr ap-
preciation of your splendid cooperation and 
patience with us.'' 
Continuing still further, the defendant mare 
contact and arranged a deal with Federal Uranium 
Corporation regarding the lease; stock of Federal 
Uranium was to be transferred to defendant. (R. 
130.) 
Other activity of the defendant corporation in-
cluded payment of the necessary rental to the State 
of Utah for 1954 and 1955 as required by the lease. 
In summary, then, we see that, despite the 
unfortunately unfavorable reports, the activity of 
the defendant corporation was single-minded and 
continuing. In what sense does this constitute aban-
donment? 
The trial court, so far as facual basis for 
abandonment is concerned, apparently relied heavi-
ly, if not exclusively, upon a letter of Mr. Stern, an 
attorney for defendant. This letter, which is in 
evidence by stipulation (R. 8), is Exhibit K at-
tached to plaintiff's Request for Admissions filed 
. ' 
March 26, 1955. 
10 
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This letter of April 30, 1954, in response to in-
sistent demands by plaintiff Best, states that, 
upon certain conditions, the directors of defendant 
would execute an assignment. These conditions ap-
pear to include the following: 
1. That plaintiff Best's then attorney should 
pr~pare the assignment. (There is no showing this 
was ever done.) 
2. That plaintiff Best should return to the 
defendant a sum of money paid by it to him. (There 
is no showing this was ever done.) 
3. That plaintiff Best should repay to de-
fendant two-thirds of the annual rent paid by the 
defendant. (There is no showing this was ever 
done.) 
Thus, we have here at most a yielding to pres-
sure, conditional upon the fulfillment of several pre-
requisites, of which none were ever complied with. 
This can indicate neither abandonment nor the 
intent to abandon. The necessary conclusion of non-
abandonment is still further reinforced by the cir-
cumstances under which the letter of April 30, 1954 
was written. 
It must be noted that the original assignment 
by plaintiff Best had been made, according to the 
allegations of plaintiff himself, only on July 17, 
11 
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1953 (Complaint, Paragr~ph 3), less than ten 
months earlier. 
Further, the acceptance of this assignment and 
agreement had been first made by defendant, ac-
cording to the allegations of said plaintiff himself, 
only on November 12, 1953 (Complaint Paragraph 
4), only about five months earlier. 
Yet, despite the continuing activities of defen-
dant, carried on in the face of the most discouraging 
reports, plaintiff Best, (Exhibit C to Interroga-
tories to Party Defendant, filed March 12, 1955) 
through his attorney, in a letter of April 26, 1954, 
placed upon defendant the heaviest pressure to re-
assign the lease. The letter states flatly that "de-
mand is hereby made upon you to reassign said 
lease to H. E. Best." 
The April 26, 1954 communication goes on to 
threaten, although politely: 
"As time appare11tly is of the essence, 
this must be done as rapidly as possible. We 
therefore hope that you will be good enough to 
give us your prompt consideration and cour-
tesy in this matter, rather than to necessitate 
a prolonged law suit and the damages which 
might flow therefrom ... " 
* * * * 
Thus the evidence shows that even the highly 
conditional (and never carried out) offer to re-
12 
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assign of April 30, 1954, was a reluctant response 
to the direct and insistent pressure of the legal rep-
resentative of Best himself. Surely then it cannot 
be deemed to constitute or afford any substantial 
evidence of abandonment. 
Nor, of course, can the continuing and finally 
successful efforts of defendant to interest someone 
else in the property, above detailed, constitute evi-
dence that defendant intended to or did abandon 
the deal. Rather, such efforts necessarily constitute 
clear and convincing evidence of the efforts of de-
fendant to carry out its contract. 
As is stated in the case of Baldwin v. Jacobs, 
(1918 182 Iowa 789, 166 N.W. 271, 272, an assign-
ment or subletting is not an abandonment, but 
rather, an assertion of right to the lease. So defen-
dant here sought to assert its right. 
Where then is the evidence of abandonment? 
It is lacking. As common sense and the cases tells 
us, a tentative, partial and and conditional offer to 
yield to pressure of lessor to surrender does not 
constitute an abandonment; it ill behooves plaintiff 
to take this inequitable position. See Becker v. Rute 
(1940) 228 Ia. 533, 293 N.W. 18, 21. 
Even a letter saying that the lessee did not 
consider further development at the time justified, 
was not held abandonment. Fischer v. Petroleum Co. 
13 
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(1943) 156 Kan. 367, 133 Pac. (2d) 95, 101, opi-
nion adhered to on rehearing in 156 Kan. 722, 137 
Pac. (2d) 139. 
Nor does the fact that defendant, working to 
advance prospects, was not physicially on the prem-
ises, operate as an abandonment, Crane v. French, 
(1940) 39 Cal. App. (2d) 642, 104 Pac. (2d) 53, 
60. There must be clear proof of intent to abandon. 
In summary, it is clear on the facts and the 
law that there is no substantial evidence supporting 
a finding of abandonment. Rather the evidence 
clearly shows that defendant, in the face of severe 
difficulties and discouragements, pusl1ed onward 
continually in its effort to further and advance the 
property. This Honorable Court should, it is re-
spectfully submitted, so hold. 
POINT II. THE FINDING AND CONCLUSION OF 
LAW OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT DEFENDANT 
COMMITTED A FORFEITURE OF ITS RIGHTS UN-
DER THE ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENT IS TOTALLY 
UNSUPPORTED BY, AND CONTRARY TO, THE EVI-
DENCE, AND IS CONTRARY TO PRINCIPLES OF 
JUSTICE AND APPLICABLE PRECEDENTS. 
The trial court found, and found upon no sub-
stantial evidence, and contrary to the strong pre-
ponderance of the evidence, that the defendant fail-
ed to operate and develop the property with reason-
able diligence. (Finding of Fact 12) sufficient to 
14 
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meet its obligation under the contemplated enter-
prise. It then concluded that the lease had been 
abandoned. 
The trial court erred grossly in several vital 
ways, which we shall show in this section of A.ppel-
lant's Brief, and summarize briefly in this intro-
ductory portion of the section. 
A. In the first place, the contract does not 
in any way contain provisions requiring instant 
mining of the property, whether or not such mining 
is economically feasible, and to imply such a provi-
sion is both totally illogical and contrary to pre-
cedent. 
B. In the second place, the defendant in this 
case fulfilled and over-fulfilled its obligations un-
der the contract. It established a $20,000 corpora-
tion for the sole purpose of dealing with the pro-
perty. It undertook many obligations, and earnestly 
carried them out, spending substantial sums and 
seeking development of the property in face of severe 
discouragements. 
C. In the third place, even if somehow the 
contract could be misconstrued and tortured into 
terms that would somehow support a conclusion of 
breach of same terms by the defendant, such sup-
posed breach could never, under law or principles 
of justice, be held sufficient to warrant anything 
more than granting of damages. 
15 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
In further portions of this section, we will 
discuss greater detail the principles and proposi-
tions above set forth. 
A. The Contract Does Not Provide For Im-
mediate Mining Regardless of Feasibility, But 
Rather Provides Impliedly For Reasonable Efforts 
By Defendant. 
The trial court found a breach of contract, 
despite the continuing efforts of the defendant in 
attempting, and finally succeeding, in finding per-
sons to invest in and furtl1er the interests of the 
property. 
But where are the provisions that were sup-
posedly breached with regard to operation of the 
property? Let us examine some of the obligations 
undertaken - and performed. 
A. The defendant promised to have a licensed 
surveyor survey the leasehold imn1ediately. 
Defendant, without contradiction or question 
fulfilled this obligation. (R. 65.) 
B. The defendant promised to pay $5,500 if 
either of two contingencies occurred. Neither of 
them happened. Admittedly, the mine on the next 
property did not adjoin the leasehold (R. 94.) and 
the Atomic Energy Commission drill report was 
unsatisfactory without any contrary evidence what-
ever. 
16 
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C. Big Jim promised to reimburse Best for 
certain travel expenses, at the time the $5,500 might 
be paid. 
D. Defendant promised to "commence opera-
tions, weather permitting, as soon as possible." 
What does this mean, and what can it mean, in 
the terms of the contract? It must mean, and it does 
mean, that the surveying operations and the se-
curing of the Atomic Energy Commission report, 
must be undertaken promptly. There is nothing 
to the contrary in the record. 
The trial court mistakenly took the view that 
the contract should and must, and therefore did, 
contain a provision requiring the mining of the pro-
perty, and unconditionally, even without regard to 
whether the land could properly and profi~ably be 
mined. 
The precedents, in Utah and elsewhere, contra-
dict the trial court's position. Thus, in Monfort v. 
Lanyon Zinc Co., ( 1903) 67 Kan. 310, 72 Pac. 784, 
it was held that where the contract so provided, a 
contract was sufficiently complied with where rent 
was paid but mineral exploration was not carried 
on. 
The correct view of law in such a situation is 
that any implied covenant creates no further obli-
gation than the employment of reasonable and pru-
dent diligence. 
17 
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Thus, in Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co. (C.C.A. 
8, 1905) 140 Fed. 801, 811-12, the court held that 
the large expense of exploration and development, 
and the fact that the lessee bears the loss of failure, 
require and entitle the lessee to protect his own in-
terests and not to proceed beyond the point of profit. 
Speal-(ing of an asserted breach of an implied 
covenant to develop, the court's opinion in the Brew-
ster case stated: 
" ... no breach can occur save where the 
absence of such diligence is both certain and 
substantial in view of the actual circum-
stances at the time, as distinguished from 
mere expectations on the part of the lessor 
and conjecture on the part of mining enthu-
siasts. The large expense incident to the work 
of exploration and development, and the fact 
that the lessee must bear the loss if the opera-
tions are not successful, require that he pro-
ceed with due regard to his own interests, 
as well as those of the lessor. No obligation 
rests on him to carry the operations beyond 
the point where they will be profitable to 
him, even if some benefit to the lessor will 
result from them." 
This same principle, 'vith an approving quota-
tion from the Brewster case, was clearly enunciated 
in the later case of Fischer v. Magnolia Petroleum 
Co. (1943) 156 Kan. 367, 133 Pac. (2d) 95, 101, 
opinion adhered to on reheari11g in 156 Kan. 722, 
137 Pac. (2d) 139. See also Sauder v. Mid-Conti-
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nent Petroleum Corp. 292 U. S. 272, 54 S. Ct. 671 
78 L.Ed. 1255, 93 A.L.R. 454, and cases collected 
at 2 Summers on Oil & Gas, Perm. Ed. § 414, p. 368, 
footnote 29. 
In the present case the trial court has erron-
eously placed upon defendant's shoulders the bur-
den of providing that it had in nowise breached any 
implied covenant. This, it is submitted, defendant 
did clearly show, while plaintiff brought forward no 
evidence tending to prove any breach of an implied 
covenant to develop under the circumstances. 
Actually, the burden to disprove a breach of 
such a covenant should not even have been placed on 
defendant. As is clearly set forth in Fischer v. Mag-
nolia Petroleum Co., supra: 
"A lessor who alleges breach of the im-
plied covenant to develop has the burden of 
showing, by substantial evidence, that the 
covenant has been breached. He must prove 
that the lessee has not acted with reasonable 
diligence under the facts and circumstances 
of the particular situation. 24 Am. Jur. 661, 
§ 184; 2 Thornton, Oil and Gas, 858, and 
cases cited footnote 177; 2 Summers, Oil and 
Gas, Perm. Ed., § 414, pp. 367, 368." 
The interpretation of the trial court would 
impose upon the defendant not the express, but the 
implied obligation, to mine the property at once, 
and regardless of whether an intersecting mine was 
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available,. or whether surveys revealed the existence 
of any minable ore on the property. 
Such an obligation was not assumed. To un-
dertake such an obligation would be not impossible 
-but foolish, reckless and unreasonable. 
Could the trial court properly assume that the 
defendant here in entering into the contract behaved 
foolishly, recklessly unreasonably? And this in the 
teeth of the contract provision providing for mini-
mum rental payments commencing not instantly-
but in 1959, thus affording a measure of the time 
perspectives in which the parties were proceeding? 
The questions provide their own plain answers. 
Of course the defendant assumed no such hidden 
mysterious obligations. Of course the trial court 
erred proposing to impose such obligations when 
the contract did not. 
A good Utah analagy to the present case is 
that of Caine v. Hagenbarth (1910) 37 Utah 69, 
106 Pac. 945, where this court also overturned a 
trial court decision purporting to place a heavy im-
plied obligation on the purchaser of a mining inter-
est. 
The opinion of the court there said - and the 
words are here almost precisely applicable: 
" . . the parties to the contract in ques-
tion were therefore dealing with things whose 
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value, in the very nature of things, was un-
certain and speculative . . . "We are further 
convinced that if such a promise had been 
squarely demanded by the respondents from 
appellant, he would promptly have refused 
to make it. Moreover, the demand of respon-
dents in view of what they had to sell and did 
sell is unfair, unjust and wholly inequitable." 
In the instant case also the respondents sold 
a mining interest whose value "in the very nature 
of things, was uncertain and speculative." 
Here as in the Caine case, if an explicit prom-
ise to mine at once in any eventuality had been de-
manded, it would undoubtedly have been refused. 
Here as in the Caine case the demand of the 
plaintiff to imply such provision "is unfair, unjust 
and wholly inequitable." 
* * * * 
The trial court here favored a forfeiture, and 
failed to require clear or any proof by the plaintiff 
of the issue of forfeiture. By its course, the court 
came squarely into conflict with the virtually uni-
form course of decisions in Utah and elsewhere dis-
favoring forfeiture. 
Thus, in the case of Munson v. A. & H. Inv. Co. 
(1923) 62 Utah 13, 218 Pac. 109, this court re-
versed on appeal a judgment of forfeiture. In so 
doing, the court's opinion stated at page 21: 
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"Forfeitures are not and never have been 
regarded by the courts with any special f~vor; 
and where a party insists upon a forfeiture 
he must make clear proof and show that he is 
entitled to it. It has ever been regarded as a 
harsh way of terminating contracts, and for 
this reason he who seeks to avail himself of 
the privileges must be held strictly within the 
limits of the authority which gives the right. 
2 W arvelle on Vendors, § 807. 
"If the contract specifies what defaults 
or breaches of conditions shall be ground for 
forfeiture, it governs the rights of the parties 
in this respect, and a forfeiture on other 
grounds not included in the contract will not 
be sustained.' 2 Black on Rescission of Con-
tracts, §418; Cughan v. Larson, 13 N.D. 373, 
100 N.W. 1088. 
" 'Such forfeitures are sustained only 
when the parties have contracted therefor, 
and the terms of the contract will not be ex-
tended to sustain forfeitures.' 39 Cyc. 1373. 
"Tested by these principles, the forfei-
ture claimed . . . cannot be sustained. 
"The forfeiture, to be upheld, must be 
authorized by the express provisions of the 
con tract . . . '' 
There can be no doubt that in this case, as in 
was not authorized by the express provisions of the 
the Munson case, the forfeiture that was declared 
contract and cannot be upheld. 
In another Utah case, that of Howortl~ v. Mills 
(1923) 62 Utah 574, 221 Pac. 165, this court again 
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took the view that ''the courts are not going to com-
pel a forfeiture, which is abhorrent to all courts, 
unless the contract requires it." 
In refusing to enforce a forfeiture in the Ho-
worth case, the unanimous opinion of the co-urt 
stated at page 579: 
"In so holding we are not only enforcing 
the terms of the contract in question as writ-
ten and as intended by the parties, but we are 
also enforcing the universally recognized 
principle that forfeitures are not favored by 
the courts, and will be enforced only when it 
is clear that such was the manifest intention 
of the parties . . . '' 
See also Alford v. Dennis (Kan. 1918) 170 
Pac. 1006, again expressing the well-known prin-
ciple that equity is reluctant to enforce a forfeiture, 
and even more reluctant to do so where such for-
feiture is sought on the basis of no express covenant. 
And see Chandler v. Hart (1911) 161 Cal. 445, 
119 Pac. 516, 519. 
B. On Any Sustainable Interpretation of the 
Agreement, Defendant Has Complied With Its Obli-
gations. 
If the contract be interpreted as requiring that 
the defendant despite unfavorable reports push for-
ward energetically to seek development of the pro-
perty as might be feasible, the defendant once again 
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has complied. It has striven diligently to secure this 
development, by interesting others in the property. 
(The details and record citations dealing with this 
effort are contained in the section showing lack of 
abandonment, and this Court is respectfully referred 
to that section .. Repitition would be needless.) 
The defendant did what was reasonable under 
the circumstances. What shall be done, to further 
the· contra~t, when a mine tunnel does not run to 
the edge of the property, though plaintiff Best had 
indicated plainly he believed it did? 
Plaintiff Best himself testified (R. 25) : 
''I stepped off and showed the distance 
to the furthest drift back in the mine and 
stated I thought the end of that drift might 
be on the property." 
He persisted in this position even after the sign-
ing of the contract, and as late as August 20, 1953, 
when he wrote in a letter to Mr. Stern, attorney 
for defenda11t (Defendant's Exhibit 1): 
"I have just returned from a conference 
with Mr. Yetter and Mr. Clark of Engineers 
Associates. They have finished the map of 
their survey of the school section and the 
mine. The back one fourth of the mine is on 
our property." 
When these expectations were disappointed 
and reports proved unfavorable, what provision of 
the contract requires immediate mining? The plain 
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and simple answer is that no provision. requires it, 
nor does justice or logic require it, nor do any 
of the applicable cases requir~ it. 
Thus, in the case of Rose v. Lanyon Zinc Co. 
( 1903) 68 Kan. 176, 7 4 Pac. 625, the reviewing 
court held that where the lease did not itself pro-
vide for the sinking of a well, they would not write 
in such a term. The court's opinion comments in 
acidly tui·ning down the argument that the contract 
should somehow be considered as implying the need 
for drilling a well : 
"If that were the purpose of the parties, 
the English language furnished abundant 
means to express it." (Page 628, Pacific Re-
porter Citation.) 
The court further stated: 
"If plaintiffs should desire to contract 
for an immediate exploration, they must have 
that right; and if they should desire to give 
an oil or gas company five years in which to 
sink a well, upon a consideration satisfactory 
to themselves, and as the result of negotia-
tions free from imposition and fraud, they 
must have that right. But having deliberately 
made a contract of the latter description, they 
have no right to call upon a court to declare 
that it is of the other kind ... " 
The trial court must not, in interpreting the 
contracts of parties, disregard or torture the pro-
visions stated. This was done here, in imposing upon 
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the defendant obligations never expressed; and yet 
this is contrary both to common sense and the con-
sensus of legal authority and precedent both in Utah 
and elsewhere. 
Thus, in the instructive and important case 
of Johnson v. Geddes (1916) 49 Utah 137, 161 Pac. 
910, this court sternly reversed a lower court hold-
ing that purchasers of a mineral land interest were 
required to pay moneys under a contract whether 
or not they obtained these moneys by sale of miner-
als extracted. 
Said Justice Frick: 
"At the threshold of this controversy we 
are again reminded that courts are created 
to enforce, and not to make contracts. In 
other words, unless it is shown that the con-
tract in question was obtained by fraud, op-
pression or duress, or that it is against law 
or public policy, or is unconscionable, it is the 
duty of the courts to enforce it according to 
its terms and not by forced construction to 
modify or disregard it." (Page 145). 
Particularly apposite also is the response of the 
court to the contention that since certain of the 
moneys were to be payable only upo11 the actual ob-
taining of it from mining, there was a necessarily 
implied obligation to mine, regardless of the profit-
ableness of such operation. To this tl1e court's opi-
nion sharply replied: 
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"The defendants did not, certainly not in 
express terms, agree to work and develop the 
mining claims. No doubt it was their inten-
tion to do that, and no doubt it was assumed 
by the plaintiffs that they would do so. There 
is, however, nothing in the contract, that 
obligates the defendants to do so at any time 
nor within what any one else might consider 
to be a reasonable time. If the plaintiffs had 
desired such a contract they should have de-
manded it ... " (Page 148). 
Even if it should eventually come about that 
the sellers of the mineral interest should not receive 
moneys out of proceeds from mining, the court 
pointed out, this was the contract of the parties. 
Too, the moneys -vvere not specified to be paid with-
in any particular time. 
Finally, the court points out that any remedy 
the plaintiffs migl).t have for breach should be for 
damages only, in a court of law. This is the expres-
sion of the court: 
"Courts of law are always open for such 
actions, and courts of equity may act only 
when the remedy at law is inadequate . . . 
Neither can a court of equity give relief mere-
ly because under a long-time contract the 
parties did not forsee and provide for all pos-
sible emergencies that might arise." 
The forceful applicability of the principles of 
the Geddes case is plain. Especially is this so when 
one considers that the delay in mining in the Geddes 
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case was the far longer one of eight years, with no 
particular effort being made by defendants to work 
or in any way develop thenmining interest. 
By way of contrast, and to show how the non-
forfeiture principles of the Geddes case apply here 
with especial strength, let it be pointed out that 
here the total elapsed time before filing of suit was 
only about one and a half years instead of eight. 
Too, here the defendant continued throughout to 
seek to promote the development of the tract, which 
was not the case in the Geddes matter. 
In summation the majority opinion says-and 
we submit that the conclusion is here manifestly 
appropriate: 
"The real question in this case may thus 
be viewed from any angle, and still we arrive 
at the same conclusion, namely, that under 
the contract the defendants did not obligate 
themselves to do things the district court has 
required of them, and hence the judgment of 
that court cannot be sustained." 
The error of the district court in imposing 
obligations never assumed by the parties is pointed 
up by the forceful ruling of this court in another 
and fairly recent case, Meagher v. Uintah Gas Co. 
(1947) 112 Utah 149, 185 Pac. (2d) 747. 
In that case this court, reviewing and reversing 
a lower court holding that lessee had lost mi11eral 
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rights by not exploring beyond the specific require-
ments of the contract, held the parties wrote the 
contract and that it had no such implied provision 
for forfeiture .. 
The court pointed out that there were specific 
obligations laid upon defendant, that these pro-
vided ample consideration, and that no others should 
be implied. 
In the present case also, there are specific obli-
gations also. Not to repeat unduly, these include, 
among others, a conditional obligation to pay $5,500, 
an absolute obligation to secure a prompt survey, 
an obligation to pay to plaintiff Best a minimum 
rental of $250.00 per year starting in 1959, and so 
on. (Exhibit B to complaint) These and others 
were performed plainly afford adequate considera-
tion ; and the court erred grievously in assuming 
that mysteriously the defendant assumed other 
onerous and unstated obligations which were some-
how breached. 
C. Even If, Contrary To The Obvious Facts 
And The Overwhelming Preponderence Of The Evi-
dence, Defendant Should Be Deemed To Have Com-
mitted A Breach, Such Breach Could In No Manner 
Warrant The Harsh Relief Of Forfeiture. 
As elsewhere discussed, we belive it is clear 
no breach of this contract on defendant's part has 
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occurred. To the contrary, we submit the overwhelm-
ing preponderance of the evidence, that defendant 
has most conscientiously carried out obligations laid 
upon it by a contract entered into by the parties. 
Even if, however, a contrary view could be 
taken, it· is crystal clear under the evidence that 
such breach would be no proper occasion for the ex-
traordinarily harsh and drastic remedy of forfeit-
ure. 
The evidence shows clearly that the assignment 
of the lease was signed in June, 1953 ( R. 9) . Sur-
veyors were engaged for a mining survey in August, 
1953 (R. 65). That summer, in pursuance of the 
agreement, the defendant corporation was duly 
formed (R. 61). A mining engineer was employed 
in August, 1953 (R. 65). Reports were received in 
June and October, 1953. 
In April, 1954, an extremely unfavorable 
Atomic Energy Commission report was received, 
and an engineer employed to interpret and explain 
it (R. 71). 
In June, July and August, 1954, defendant's 
president traveled to New York and contacted 
various firms to enlist their aid with regard to the 
property (R. 72, 75, 85). 
In October, a communication was received 
from a Los Angeles mining firm dealing with de-
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fendant's efforts to interest the firm, and the firm's 
appreciation of defendant's efforts (Defendant's 
Exhibit 4). 
Efforts continued, and a deal regarding the 
lease was arranged ( R. 130). 
The instant suit was filed on November 10, 
1954. 
From the above it is obvious that defendant's 
efforts to fulfill its obligations were continuing, and 
extended right down to the time of the filing of the 
complaint. It is also obvious that the reports were 
uniformly unfavorable. 
Further, no more than about sixteen months in 
all elapsed between the execution of the assignment 
and the filing of suit. 
Therefore, it is submitted that even if a breach 
could be deemed to have been committed, it was 
neither long continued, nor substantial, nor was it 
an intentional repudiation of any of defendant's 
obligations. 
Under these circumstances, declaration of a 
forfeiture would be a shock to conscience and a vio-
lation of legal principles and precedent. If plain-
tiff were entitled to a remedy, which is strongly 
denied, that remedy should not be the drastic one 
of forfeiture. 
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In the case of Alford v. Dennis (Kan. 1918) 
170 Pac. 1006 even where it appeared that defen-
dant might have committed some breach, the harsh 
remedy of forfeiture was denied. The trial court 
was instead directed either to fix damages or to 
require defendants "to proceed in good faith to 
prospect and develop plaintiffs lands within a rea-
sonable time, to be fixed by the trial court." (Page 
1007.) 
In language generally appropriate to the pre-
sent case, the reviewing court stated: 
"The plaintiff asks the court to cancel 
this contract, to decree a forfeiture of it, and 
not for default of any expressed provision of 
the contract, but merely for default of one 
of its implied covenant.s. The instances are 
rare where equity will enforce a forfeiture. 
It will never do so where less drastic redress 
will satisfy the demands of justice. Brewster 
v. Lanyon Zinc Co., 140 Fed. 801, 72 C. C. A. 
213. Forfeitures of oil and gas leases for 
breaches of mere implied covenants are sel-
dom decreed. Davis v. Gas Co., 78 Kan. 97, 96 
Pac. 47; Brewster v. Lanyon Zinc Co., supra; 
Thornton's Law Relating to Oil and Gas (2d 
Ed.) §§ 91, 157." 
Similarly, forfeiture for breach was denied in 
the case of Hower·ton v. Gas Co., 81 Kan. 553, 106 
Pac. 47, 34 L.R.A. (N.S.) 34;-Id., 82 Kan. 367, 108 
Pac. 813, 34 L.R.A. ( N.S.) 46. 
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As in the Alford case, the cause was remanded 
either to determine damages or to require drilling 
within a reasonable time. 
Plainly, the relief of forfeiture is likewise to-
tally i~appropriate in the instant case. 
We submit plaintiff is entitled to no relief; but 
were a different conclusion reasonable, still for-
feiture would be far too harsh a remedy. 
* * * * 
Another cogent reason that forfeiture is an 
inappropriate remedy is that the development of 
the property was, under the evidence, only an inci-
dental objective of plaintiff Best in entering into the 
contract. His primary objective, as shown both by 
the agreement itself and by his own written and oral 
admissions was to obtain his opportunity for the 
$5,500; and it was because he did not receive the 
$5,500 that this action was commenced. This will be 
shown by specific record citations. 
Under this state of the facts, the cases are plain 
that plaintiff cannot obtain forfeiture where the 
breach is only a covenant which is only incidental 
to the primary purpose. 
We turn now to an examination of the facts in 
this case. It may first be observed that the agree-
ment itself (attached as an exhibit to the complaint 
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of plaintiff) provides for the payment of $5,500 
upon certain cont~encies (which, as more fully 
stated elsewhere, did not come to pass). The agree-
ment notably provides for additional minimum rent-
al payments to plaintiff commencing in 1959, 
against royalty payments. Thus the parties plainly 
made their own interpretation of 1959 as the time 
before which defendant should not be required to 
mine if the tunnel in the adjacent property did not 
intersect with the leased property. 
But we do not need to rely upon such reasonable 
but indirect interpretation as to whether it was the 
$5,500 contingently payable or mining development 
that was the princip#inducement and consideration 
to plaintiff Best. Let us examine his own letter of 
September 9, 1953, to Mr. Stern. This letter is at-
tached as Exhibit A to plaintiff's Request for Ad-
mission of March 12, 1955. It is in evidence by stipu-
lation and was in part also orally read into the 
record ( R. 33.) 
In this letter Plaintiff Best himself specifi-
cally states: 
"Therefore because I do need some cash 
which is the original reason that considera-
tion was ever given to transferring the 
school section . . . " 
Reinforcing still further his written admission, 
plaintiff Best himself acknowledged orally in court 
that it was because he wanted $5,500, and not be-
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cause he wanted mining development, that he in-
stituted the present action. At page 52 of the Re-
porter's Transcript, in response to a question as to 
whether he had ever been offered $5,500 by defen-
dant prior to commencement of suit, plaintiff re-
vealingly testified: 
''A. No. That's why I started suit to get 
the property back." 
The reason that plaintiff did not get his $5,500 
is plain. None of the contingencies upon which the 
parties contracted that he should receive it actually 
occurred, and defendant was left with the dismal 
and difficult task of attempting to further the in-
terests of the property even though ingress meant 
digging no mine, and the reports, elsewhere cited, 
were miserably unfavorable. 
However, what is of interest is the open ac-
knowledgment by the plaintiff that he started the 
present action not because of any supposed delin-
quency with regard to breach of a proposed covenant 
regarding mining, but rather because he did not 
receive the $5,500 which obviously he was not en-
titled to receive. Nonetheless, plaintiff did have the 
full opportunity to receive that $5,500 if events 
turned out as he himself stated and contracted that 
they should. That this was the real and sufficient 
consideration can hardly be disputed on the basis of 
the above. 
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The cases are clear that where a contract is 
substantially fulfilled it cannot be forfeited even 
for breach, if the breach is of a promise which is not 
the principal consideration. 
This was the holding in the case of Watchorn 
v. Roxana Petroleum Corp. (1925) 5 Fed. (2d) --636. 
In stating and holding to this effect, the court's opi-
nion in the Watchorn case laid down the principle 
In extremely appropriate language, herewith 
quoted: 
'' ... it is well established that where a 
contract is substantially executed it cannot be 
rescinded for breach of covenant incidental to 
its main purpose. The remedy is recovery 
of damages for the breach. Howe v. Howe & 
Owen Ball Bearing Co., et al., 154 F. 820, 83 
C.C.A. 536; Kauffman v. Raeder, et al., 108 
F. 171, 47 C.C.A. 278, 54 L.R.A. 247; Neenan 
v. Otis Elevator Co. (C.C.) 180 F. 997; Oscar 
Barnett Foundry Co. v. Crowe, 219 F. 450, 
135 C. C.A. 162." 
Therefore, even if a breach by defendant be 
assumed, it was neither substantial, long continued, 
nor with regard to the primary purpose of the con-
tract. Under familiar principles of equity, the judg-
ment of the trial court granting forfeiture would 
still be far too harsh, and a different decree more 
soundly based upon equitable principles would re-
quire to be framed. 
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POINT III. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT EX-
PLICITLY FIND OR CONCLUDE THAT THE CON-
TRACT OF DEFENDANT AND PLAINTIFF BEST WAS 
UNENFORCEABLE BY REASON OF LACK OF MU-
TUALITY; BUT IF SUCH FINDING OR CONCLUSION 
BE DEEMED IMPLICIT, IT IS TOTALLY CONTRARY 
TO ALL EVIDENCE AND TO THE AUTHORITIES. 
The trial court made no conclusion of law in-
dicating its decision was in any manner based upon 
lack of mutuality of obligation. If, however, any 
such implied conclusion could somehow be drawn 
from the somewhat ambiguous Finding of Fact 7: 
"The Agreement provided that the defen-
dant in this action could abandon the contem-
plated enterprise with impunity," 
then such finding and conclusion are in no wise 
supported by the evidence or precedent. Hence they 
could not possibly support the judgment of the trial 
court. 
As is stated in 1 Williston on Contracts, 504: 
"It is often stated as if it were a re-
quisite in the formation of contracts that 
there must be mutuality. This statement is 
likely to cause confusion and, however limited, 
is at best an unnecessary way of saying that 
there must be valid consideration." 
hf e~hJA Lir"Y, iS. 4fc_ k',. •IV (],-
While of course,J.f there is Initially a right of 
immediate cancellation without notice and without 
fulfillment of any obligation whatever, there is in 
the instant case no such factual situation. 
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The original agreement here, incorporated into 
the complaint, shows clearly that, before defendant 
could have the right to exercise the abandonment 
clause, it was obligated: 
1. To hire a surveyor to survey the leasehold; 
2. To pay $5,500 if the surveyor's report 
showed that an adjoining tunnel run to the edge 
of the property, or if Atomic Energy Commission 
reports were favorable; 
3. To pay certain traveling expenses of the 
assignor at the time the $5,500 might become pay-
able; 
4. To keep the lease in good standing by pay-
ing necessary rental while these other obligations 
were being carried forward. 
The above does not exhaust the necessary obli-
gations of defendant; but it suffices to show that 
there were many obligations of defendant under the 
contract. 
The matters show ample consideration for the 
assignment-and consideration which has been ex-
ecuted. 
Thus plaintiff cannot avoid the contract by as-
serting that at some later point, after the defen-
dant's undertaking many obligations and giving 
much consideration, the defendant might be able 
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under the contract to exercise a right to cancel, upon 
certain further considerations. There is no way of 
segregating out consideration and saying that cer-
tain of the agreements have consideration and other 
do not; this is contrary to precedent and principle. 
As is said in the California case of Tennant 
v. Wilde (1929) 98 Cal. App. 437, 277 Pac. 137, 
139: 
" ... it may be said that, where there is 
consideration for any of the agreements speci-
fied in a contract the contract as a whole can-
not be said to lack mutuality or consideration, 
nor can any particular promise or agreement 
contained therein be singled out and deemed 
inoperative because no special or particular 
consideration appears to have been given or 
promised for it." 
See also authorities there cited; and Hill v. 
General Petroleum Corp. (1932) 128 Cal. App. 284, 
l6 Pac: (2d) 1035; and authorities cited at 12 Am. 
Jur. 511. 
Here we have the situation of plaintiff Best 
having assigned his interest under the State of Utah 
lease to defendant. 
Yet even in the weaker situation of the grant-
ing of a license, Utah courts have held that this too 
might and did become irrevocable where money 
was spent in good faith in reliance upon a continu-
ance of the license. Kennedy Combined Metals Re-
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duction Co. (1935) 87 Utah 532 51 Pac (2d) 1064. 
See also Migliacco v. Davis (1951) 120 Utah 1, 232 
Pac (2d) 195. 
Defendant's Duty of Assignment on Abandon-
ment Would Itself Furnish Consideratrion. 
l-
It should also be pointed out that any right to 
abandon the contract at any time, even after the 
giving of ample separate consideration, is expressly 
accompanied by the duty of reassignment imposed 
by the contract itself, which states, (See Exhibit 
B to Complaint) : 
''In the event of the abandonment of said 
mine, assignee must reassign said lease to 
assignor.'' 
It is the correct rule, and is generally held, that 
where, as here, the right of abandonment is coupled 
with a detriment, such as the one here involved of 
reassignment, this is sufficient to meet the require-
ment of valid consideration. See authorities cited 
at 1 Williston on Contracts 365 and Brewster v. 
Lanyon Zinc Co. (C.C.A. 8, 1905) 140. 801, 811-12. 
There were many obligations imposed on defen-
dant, and it filfilled them; and it expended time, 
money and effort with regard to the property. Fur-
ther, even the requirement of reassignment upon a 
closing out of the contract would furnish considera-
tion. 
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Thus, in the light of the foregoing, it is sub-
mitted that from any viewpoint, any effort must 
fail which would seek to support the erroneous judg-
ment of the trial court on the basis of supposed lack 
of mutual~ty. 
POINT IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED 
REVERSIBLE ERROR AND INJUSTICE IN PERMITT-
ING AMENDMENT AS TO PARTIES PLAINTIFF AT 
THE TRIAL WITHOUT SWORN TESTIMONY, WHILE 
AT THE· SAME TIME DENYING TO DEFENDANT 
THE RIGHT TO LITIGATE THE IMPORTANT ISSUE 
OF REAL PARTIES IN INTEREST, WHICH DEFEN--
DANT HAD SPECIFICALLY RAISED AS AN ISSUE 
BY AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE IN ITS ANSWER. 
In the instant case the trial court permitted 
and indeed insisted without sworn testimony upon 
the entry of an amendment to the pleading including 
a new party as the owner of one-half of the original 
party's claim. 
This was done, apparently, because the trial 
court felt that its pretrial order limited the issues 
and excluded the issue of whether plaintiff Best in 
fact ·cheld the claim at the time of commencement of 
suit. Yet in point of fact, and contrary to the plain 
mandate of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial 
court in fact made no formal order following the 
pretrial ( R. 42), and the defendant had sharply 
and specifically raised the issue of ownership in its 
answer, which issue the trial court nevertheless ex-
cluded from those triable at the trial. 
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Nonetheless, the trial court, in accordance with 
the request of plaintiff Best's counsel, heard such 
evidence as st1ch plaintiff wished to present on the 
subject of ownership. This consisted solely and ex-
clusively of the testimony, totally unsworn, of one 
of the plaintiff's counsel. Permitting no rebuttal 
of such testimony, the trial court acted upon it and 
upon it exclusively, and entered its order amending 
the pleadings to add plaintiff Craig as a party 
plaintiff. 
* * * * 
While the above statements may seem startling 
and exaggerated, each of them is exactly correct, 
and will be demonstrated to be so in the body of this 
section of appellant's brief. 
The defendant in its answer sharply raised the 
question of whether title was in plaintiff Best when 
the suit was brought. 
Its answer stated at Paragraph 8 thereof: 
"That the plaintiff is not the real party 
in interest in this action and that the plain-
tiff has assigned to another person or per-
sons his right to receive 16%% of the gross 
mill receipts after first deducting from the 
gross mill receipts 12%% of the said mill re-
ceipts which said 12%% is paid to the State 
of Utah as part of the rent for the said lease-
hold." 
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A pretrial hearing was held on March 28, 1955. 
Rule 16 of the Rules of Civil Procedure pro-
vides in relevant part: 
"The court shall make an order which re-
cites the action taken at the conference, the 
amendments allowed to.the pleadings, and the 
agreements made by the parties as to any of 
the matters considered, and which limits the 
issues for trial to those not disposed of by 
admissions or agreements of counsel; and 
such order when entered controls the sub-
sequent course of the action; unless modified 
at the trial to prevent manifest injustice." 
It nowhere appears in the record, despite the 
rule's plain provision that the "court shall make an 
order which recites the action taken at the confer-
ence ... and which limits the issues for trial," that 
any such written order or any order at all was made 
by the trial court. 
Indeed, the evidence is to the contrary; and 
shows plainly that the trial court did not prepare a 
pretrial order, though it admitted that it should 
have done so. We quote from the record (R. 42), 
with Mr. Arnovitz, trial counsel for defendant, 
speaking: 
"Now in justification of my position in 
this, I asked, and I don't criticize the reporter, 
and I take it for granted the reporter has 
plenty of business to do. But at that time in 
order to be sure, the courts generally make 
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up an arder, at least in our district, and say 
these are the issues. 
"THE COURT: Now listen, on that I 
dictated that off. Just almost like you read it. 
And I asked you fellows if you thought that 
I need prepare a formal order and both of 
you said no. 
"MR. ARNOVITZ: Well I don't know 
if that is in here. Is it, I don't know. I don't 
recall that is in here. I don't recall the court 
asking whether to prepare a formal order or 
not. 
"THE COURT: Well I should have 
written a pretrial order. I thought that this 
here was a simple lawsuit that we have, with 
all those four or five problems I set them out. 
"MR. ARNOVITZ: And, Your Honor, 
when I asked for the order I did it with the 
idea that I would then have before me the 
order so if there was anything that needed 
to be called to the court's attention I would 
have it. Now it didn't come." 
That such pretrial order, gravely affecting as it 
does the entire course of the proceedings, is to be 
written one, would be obvious even without prece-
dent. But of course the cases exist, though we need 
not here multiply citations. Let us simply take for 
example a case under the similar Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure 16. It is that of Clark v. United 
States, (D. C., Oregon, 1952) 18 Fed. -Rules Serv-
ice 16.21, Case 1; 13 F.R.D. 342. Here it is made 
perfectly clear that the pretrial order is to be in 
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writing. Indeed, it should be drafted by counsel for 
the parties, since it is in effect a pleading. This is 
the view strongly taken in the above case, written 
by District Judge (now Ninth Circuit Judge) Fee. 
It is plain that the total absence of such a writ-
ten pretrial order contributed largely to the con-
fusion, and to the error of the trial court in denying 
to plaintiff the right to litigate the weighty and 
pleaded issue of real pary in interest. The trial 
court treated pretrial as limiting issues irrevocably, 
as far as defendant was concerned; yet no actual 
order ever issued from the pretrial hearing. 
Plaintiff Best's original complaint did not al-
lege that anyone but himself was a proper plaintiff 
party in interest. Nor was any effort made by plain-
tiff prior to trial to amend the complaint to include 
anyone else as a plaintiff. 
On the other hand, as above stated, in Para-
graph 8 of its answer defendant denied sharply that 
Best was the only or the proper party in interest. 
With the foregoing history, it seems clear that 
the defendant had raised the issue of real party in 
interest, and had not been foreclosed by the pretrial 
order (for there was no such order) from pursuing 
such issue. 
As the court itself said with regard to this 
45 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
issue, this is an important issue and one which was 
pleaded. To quote: 
'' ... of course this matter is quite sub-
stantial, this question of party in interest. 
But on the other hand you had pleaded that. 
Of course, I think counsel should call it to the 
court's attention, but nevertheless, the prob-
lem is still there." ( R. 38. ) 
The trial court regarded it as important, but 
plaintiff's counsel, who admitted he had known for 
months of another interest being involved (R. 39) 
nonetheless had made no move to amend the plead-
ings prior to trial. Speaking of Earl Craig, the per-
son later in trial added as plaintiff, Mr. Baucom, 
trial counsel for plaintiff Best, declared: 
"I didn't think it was substantial, I really 
didn't think anything about it." (R. 40.) 
The trial court (R. 45) granted the motion to 
make Earl Craig a party plaintiff. This was done 
entirely without any sworn evidence being placed 
before the trial court, on the basis of the unsworn 
comments, not subject to cross-examination or re-
buttal, of Mr. Baucom, trial counsel for plaintiff 
Best. These unsworn comments appear principally 
at page 38 and 39 of the reporter's trial transcript. 
The granting of the motion to add Craig as a 
party plaintiff was, then, plainly based upon no 
substantial evidence. 
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No personal criticism of plaintiff's counsel is 
intended or should be implied; but it is an old and 
sound tradition of our Anglo-American common law, 
supported by many precedents, that a trial attorney 
should not testify as to substantial and important 
issues involved in the case he is trying. And the 
fallacy of basing a decision on an important issue 
on such testimony, and such testimony alone, is 
glaringly magnified when the testimony of the at-
torney is merely unsworn comment. 
To carry its error still further, the trial court 
sternly refused to permit counsel for defendant even 
to inquire into the subject. (R. 35.) 
Late in the trial, defendant's counsel sought to 
go into the question as to whether Best "has any 
interest left in this property at all, as to whether 
he is a proper party plaintiff at all." (R. 134) 
Mter further colloquy, the trial court specifi-
cally forbade further questioning and stated with 
regard to the question of real party in interest: 
"Well, I will preclude you from that in-
vestigation." (R. 135) 
Thus, by the foregoing chain of events and rul-
ings, defendant was totally barred from litigating 
an important issue it had pleaded, while on the other 
hand the plaintiff was permitted and ordered to 
amend its pleadings on the basis of the unsworn 
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testimony of plaintiff's counsel, of which no rebut-
tal was permitted. 
That this was serious and reversible error ad-
mits of no question. It leaves totally unsupported 
the status of the plaintiff as real parties in interest, 
and foreclosed the right of defendant to litigate this 
question. 
Under previous rules of procedure, such rulings 
have in the past required reversal by this Court of 
trial court judgments. Thus, in Skews v. Dunn 
(1882), 3 Utah 186, 2 Pac. 64, this -Court held that 
the trial court erred reversibly in substituting one 
plaintiff for another, in violation of principles 
governing determination of the real party in in-
terest. 
Turning for interpretation of our modern rules 
on pretrial to decisions under the similar Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, we find that the federal 
cases condemn the failure to have a written pretrial 
order "well before the trial." Reversal was held 
required in Burton v. liV eyerl~aeused Timber Co. 
(U.S.D.C. Ore., 1941) 4 Fed Rules Service~ 16.32, 
Case 2, because of confusion arising over certain 
issues at the trial. 
The failure in reg·ard to the pretrial order was 
emphasized as a ca&al factor in the confusion which 
required reversal. 
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In this general regard another federal case and 
its principles should be noted. It is true that the in-
stant case does not even involve an actual pretrial 
order duly prepared. But even if it did involve such 
an order, the rigidity and inflexibility of the trial 
court would be error. 
This is well illiustrated by the case of Geopulos 
v. Mandes (U.S.D.C., Dist. of Columbia 1940) 4 
Federal Rules eSrvice, 16.33, case 1. Here the issue 
of laches was apparently waived by defendant. How-
ever, where this was shown to be inadvertent, and 
where defendant had earlier tried to assert this 
issue amendment was permitted to include this is-
sue in the pretrial order. The guiding principle is 
that where rigid adherence to the issue set down in 
the pretrial order will cause injustice, these issues 
may be enlarged. 
CONCLUSION 
We believe we have shown clearly that there 
was in this case no forfeiture, no abandonment, no 
lack of mutuality. We believe the trial court also 
erred reversibly in prohibiting to defendant ex-
ploration of the pleaded issue of real party in in-
terest, while at the same time permitting and order-
ing amendment as to parties plaintiff on the un-
sworn testimony of plaintiff's counsel. It is sub-
mitted that justice requires the reversal of the trial 
49 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
court, to avoid effects of an unjust forfeiture de-
clared against defendant. 
Worthy counsel for respondents will try to es .. 
cape the inescapable facts of trial court errors, by 
citing some matters or cases not specifically re-
ferred to in this brief. Yet the fatal errors are in 
the record, and we believe will remain there despite 
all efforts of respondents to deal with them. 
It is respectfully submitted and prayed that 
this Honorable Court, by reason of each of the errors 
discussed in earlier sections of this brief, should 
reverse the judgment of the trial court and grant 
defendant a judgment to avoid a most inequitable 
and legally unwarranted forfeiture. 
Respectfully submitted, 
WHITE, ARNOVITZ & SMITH 
Associate, LAWRENCE W. 
STEINBERG 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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